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　Ⅰ　Introduction
　Tokyo Dome, home to the Yomiuri Giants 
baseball team, is one of the only large scale air 
inflated sports facilities in the world （Viquez, 
2020）. Conveniently located in the heart of 
the Suidobashi district in central Tokyo, the 
57,000-capacity stadium stands as the center-
piece of Tokyo Dome City, a 130,000 square 
meter sports and entertainment complex owned 
and operated by the Tokyo Dome Corporation. 
Tokyo Dome Corp. was established under its 
former corporate name, Korakuen Stadium 
Corporation, and first listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange in 1949. The Korakuen Stadium 
opened it gates to the public in 1937 and served 
as the home field to Korakuen Baseball club 
and eventually the Giants until it was replaced 
by the newly constructed Tokyo Dome in 1988. 
Seeking to realize their vision of integrating 
sports and entertainment, Korakuen Stadium 
Corp. launched a project in the 1950s to build 
the Korakuen Amusement Park in the area ad-
jacent to the stadium. This laid the groundwork 
for a more ambitious integration of sports and 
entertainment, evident today in Tokyo Dome 
City. Along with its iconic Dome, the Tokyo 
Dome City complex has expanded to include 
other sports facilities, event halls, food and retail 
outlets, a hotel and spa, an amusement park, 
and the Japanese Baseball Hall of Fame （Tokyo 
Dome, 2020b）. Tokyo Dome City represents the 
culmination of a long term transformation from 
it precursor, the historic Korakuen Stadium and 
its surrounding facilities.
　In November of 2020, Mitsui Fudosan, a major 
real estate development company, announced 
its tender offer bid （TOB） for Tokyo Dome 
Corp., the parent company of Tokyo Dome City 
and other sports facilities, shopping centers and 
hotels in Japan. The business media portrayed 
this as a friendly or “white-knight” bid by Mit-
sui Fudosan to fend off increasingly aggressive 
activist overtures by Oasis Management Com-
pany （Oasis）, a Hong Kong based fund. This 
paper provides preliminary empirical evidence 
on how the market perceived and reacted to 
the TOB for Tokyo Dome Corp. To this end, we 
employed an event study to gauge the impact of 
the TOB announcement on stock prices of both 
the acquirer and target. We then turn to an 
Economic Value Added （EVA） analysis which 
provides a practical framework grounded in 
finance theory to assess whether the claims of 
operational mismanagement made by Oasis are 
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　Ⅱ　 The Tender Offer Bid for Tokyo 
Dome Corporation
　The Mitsui Fudosan TOB for Tokyo Dome 
corporation was announced on 27 November 
2020. The tender offer commenced 29 Novem-
ber 2020 and ended 18 January 2021 in accor-
dance with the duration guidelines set by the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1971 stipulating 
the offer be set at 20 to 60 days from the public 
notice of the offer （Komoto, 2000）. Based on 
the terms of the TOB, Mitsui Fudosan would 
purchase all tendered shares of Tokyo Dome 
Corp. at 1,300 yen per share, subject to the con-
dition of the minimum purchase requirement of 
61,805,100, representing two-thirds of the voting 
rights of the firm, being met. At the close of the 
TOB, the final tally of shares tendered stood 
at 78,737,609 shares or 85 percent of the shares 
outstanding （Tokyo Dome, 2021）. 
　On 30 January 2020, nearly a year prior to the 
settlement of the Mitsui Fudosan TOB, Oasis 
Management holding a 9.61 percent stake in the 
share of Tokyo Dome Corp., submitted a prelim-
inary proposal to purchase all of Tokyo Dome 
Corp. shares at 1,300 yen per share. Shortly 
thereafter, Oasis publicly released a compre-
hensive plan to renovate the aging stadium and 
its adjacent entertainment and hotel facilities. 
Titled “A Better Tokyo Dome,” the plan crit-
icized areas that Oasis perceived as misman-
aged opportunities for revenue and growth. 
The aged Dome offered room for improvement 
including digital infrastructure to boost spon-
sorship revenues as well as the potential sale of 
naming rights （Oasis, 2020）. Meetings between 
Tokyo Dome Corp. and Oasis over the following 
months failed to reach a mutually agreeable 
outcome. The timeline of the events are summa-
rized in Table 1.
　In August 2020, Tokyo Dome Corp. manage-
ment under increasing pressure from Oasis be-
gan soliciting business proposals including price 
and number shares to be purchased. Mitsui Fu-
dosan proposed to purchase all outstanding To-
kyo Dome Corp. shares and separately arranged 
Table １　Timeline of Events
January 30  Oasis approaches Tokyo Dome with preliminary offer of 1,300 yen per share  
January 31 Oasis proposes “A Better Tokyo Dome”  
February Oasis and Tokyo Dome meet 
June Oasis and Tokyo Dome meet  
July Tokyo Dome, Yomiuri Shimbun, Yomiuri Giants hold joint press conference  
August Tokyo Dome reviews various proposals for TOB including Mitsui Fudosan 
October 19 OASIS calls for an extraordinary general meeting（EGM）of shareholders  
to remove three Directors: T. Nagaoka, N. Mori, T. Akiyama 
November 10 Announces EGM for December 17 
November 12 Mitsui Fudosan proposes TOB at 1,200 yen with Yomiuri Shimbun Holdings 
November 18 Revised proposal to 1,250 yen 
November 24 Final proposal at 1,300 yen 
November 26 Tokyo Dome accepts November 24  proposal at 1,300 yen
November 27 Officially Announce TOB for Tokyo Dome  
Note:  compiled by authors from press release （Tokyo Dome, 2020a）.
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to sell 20 percent of the acquired firm to the 
Yomiuri Shimbun Group, the owner of the Yo-
miuri Giants. This agreement effectively made 
Tokyo Dome Corp. a jointly operated subsidiary 
of a newly forged alliance between Yomiuri 
Shimbun and Mitsui Fudosan. By integrating 
the operations of the Yomiuri Giants baseball 
team with that of the stadium facilities, and 
leveraging Mitsui Fudosan’s know-how in real 
estate development, they expected to capitalize 
on the potential synergy effects from “improving 
customer satisfaction and profitability” （Tokyo 
Dome, 2020a, p.13）. Mitsui Fudosan’s earlier de-
velopment projects - the Mitsui Fudosan Sport 
Academy and Tokyo Midtown Hibiya project 
– afforded them unique insights into the devel-
opment of “neighborhoods” centered around 
sports and entertainment. Coupled with the 
support of the Giants, one of the most market-
able brands in Japanese professional sports, the 
acquisition and partnership presented an oppor-
tunity and challenge like no other.
　The effort to modernize the 32 year old 
Dome would require significant investments 
to upgrade physical and digital infrastructure 
in order to improve the fan experience and 
profitability. The installing of LED sponsorship 
signage, implementing of new digital technolo-
gy for large scale displays, and enhancing the 
viewing environment in hospitality areas should 
help boost revenue growth. The introduction of 
mobile order systems for food and beverage ser-
vice, and high density Wi-Fi and 5G communi-
cations infrastructure should lay the foundation 
for greater opportunities for digital fan engage-
ment （Tokyo Dome, 2020a）. 
　The plan outlined in the Tokyo Dome Corp. 
press release of 27 November 2020 for renovat-
ing the Dome facilities is consistent with the 
Oasis business proposal （2020） with stadium 
naming rights standing out as the one major 
exception. Oasis （2020） estimated that the 
Tokyo Dome naming rights could generate an 
increase of 0.6 billion yen in annual profits. Oasis 
envisioned a long term naming rights deal of 10 
years or more, packaged together with exclu-
sive benefits including hospitality related privi-
leges such as tickets and premium seating, and 
additional opportunities to promote the products 
and services of the sponsoring company. 
 
　Ⅲ　Event Study
　To assess the extent to which the news of the 
November 2020 TOB for Tokyo Dome Corp. is 
reflected in the market, we undertook an event 
study （Weston et al., 1998）. The market model 
to obtain the abnormal returns is specified in 
equation （1） as 
= + +  　　　　　　　　 （1）
　where 　 is the daily return for Tokyo Dome 
Corp. or Mitsui Fudosan, 　 is the proxy for 
the market, and +   the error term for the t  th 
observation. The TOPIX index was used as the 
proxy for the market. We estimated the market 
model over a sample ranging from 120 days pri-
or to the event window from t = -141 days to t 
= -21 days for an estimation period of 6 months 
（assuming 20 trading days per month）. The 
market betas for Tokyo Dome Corp. and Mitsui 
Fudosan were estimated at 1.42 （p<0.01） and 
1.64 （p<0.01） with an adjusted R2 of 0.46 an 0.53 
respectively. The abnormal returns, , were 
then calculated （equation 2） for the period 20 
days before and after the official announcement 
of the tender offer bid on 27 November 2020 （t 
= -20 to t = +20）, giving us an event window of 
41 days.
= −（ + ） 　　　　 （2）
= ∑ 　　　　　　　　　（3）
　The cumulative abnormal returns （CAR） for 
Tokyo Dome Corp. （equation 3） over the 41 day 
event window are plotted in Figure 1. We ob-
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serve a statistically significant spike in the CAR 
for Tokyo Dome Corp. at the announcement 
date of 27 November （t=0） suggesting the mar-
ket reacted positively to the information of the 
TOB. The abnormal returns are reported for t 
= -15 to t = +5 in Table 2. 
　Interestingly, we did not observe an equiva-
lent jump in the CAR for the bidder, Mitsui Fu-
dosan, on the official announcement date （Figure 
2）. The abnormal return, however, was positive 
and statistically significant on 10 November （t 
= -12） when Tokyo Dome Corp. officially an-
nounced opposition to the Oasis proposal to re-
move its Directors （Table 2）. The general pat-
tern and trends observed for the CAR for both 
Tokyo Dome Corp. and Mitsui Fudosan were 
consistent with preliminary evidence provided 
by Komoto （2000） for a sample of 40 acquired 
companies and 24 acquirers in the 1990s and 
Iwai （2012） using a slightly updated data set of 
298 target companies. These findings are also 
consistent with empirical research for the US 
market as summarized in Weston et al. （1998） 
and Gaughn （1999）. 
　We also undertook an event study for Nippon 
TV Holdings since it controls the broadcasting 
Figure １　CAR for Tokyo Dome （t = -20 to t = +20）
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Table ２　Abnormal Returns （t=-15 to t=+5）
Note: announcement date t=0 is 27 November 2020. *: p<0.01.
rights to the Yomiuri Giants baseball games. 
While CAR exhibits a negative trend in the 
event window, we observe an upward spike 
in abnormal returns on the date of the TOB 
announcement for Tokyo Dome Corp. and a 
relatively large positive abnormal return on 10 
November as in the case for Mitsui Fudosan 
（Figure 3）. 
　We also provide preliminary evidence of a 
time varying market beta especially around 
the announcement date. A constant correlation 
bivariate GARCH（1,1） model is estimated to 
obtain time varying betas （Bollerslev, 1990; 
Kroner & Sultan, 1993; Engle and Kroner, 1995）. 
The mean equations in the GARCH model are
, = + ,  　　　　　　  （4）
, = + ,
, = + ,  　　　　　　  （5）
where   is the daily return for Tokyo Dome 
Corp. stock （TD） and the TOPIX index （MKT）, 
   denotes a constant, and    is a normally dis-
tributed error term. The conditional variance 
for the Tokyo Dome Corp. （TD） stock returns 
and TOPIX index （MKT） returns ,   and 
　　　　respectively, are given as
, = + , + ,  　（6）, , ,
, = + , + ,  
（7）






t = -15 1.69 1.00 -0.98 0.57 
t = -14 -0.002 0.001 -4.97 2.92* 
t = -13 -1.49 0.88 -2.61 1.53 
t = -12 0.46 0.27 9.50 5.59* 
t = -11 4.51 2.68* 2.36 1.39 
t = -10 -0.76 0.45 -2.67 1.56 
t = -9 -4.93 2.92* -2.65 1.55 
t = -8 0.96 0.57 3.82 2.25 
t = -7 1.19 0.71 1.54 0.90 
t = -6 -2.57 1.54 1.41 0.83 
t = -5 -1.20 0.71 0.50 0.29 
t = -4 0.51 0.30 -0.05 0.03 
t = -3 -1.07 0.63 -0.44 0.65 
t = -2 -3.44 2.04 1.11 -0.73  
t = -1 -1.24 0.74 -1.24 0.75 
t = 0 14.74  8.75* 1.28 0.75 
t = +1 27.67  16.42*  -2.27 1.33 
t = +2 -0.93 0.55 1.59 0.93 
t = +3 5.94 3.52* 0.64 0.37 
t = +4 -5.66 3.36* 2.69 1.58 
t = +5 -0.19 0.11 -2.15 1.26 
 ,  






















　where the correlation between the returns, 　, 
is assumed to be constant.   denotes the condi-
tional standard deviation or covariance depend-
ing on the subscripts,   and   are coefficients, 
and the constant, , is the unconditional vari-
ance. The market beta is then obtained as the 
ratio of the fitted time series of the conditional 
covariance and conditional market variance 
 ,
,  
 . The fitted market betas are plotted in 
Figure 4.
　The correlation is estimated at 0.42 with 
+ =  0.88 （<1） and + = 0.95 
（<1） indicating some persistence in the volatil-
ity. The fitted market beta hovers around one 
over the sample period ranging from January 
2018 to December 2020 （715 observations）. The 
time varying beta, however, jumps on the an-
nouncement date of November 27 to 3.25 and 
then 4.9 the following day. If the ex-post fitted 
GARCH beta of 3.25 or even 4.9 is used to ob-
tain the abnormal returns for the announcement 
date, this would not alter our qualitative find-
ings for the event study thus indicating the re-
sults are robust to estimates of the market beta. 
We also note that our findings summarized in 
Table 2 are robust to the length of the estima-
Figure ３　CAR for Nippon TV Holdings （t = -20 to t = +20）
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tion period and event window as well as market 
index. The CAR obtained using the NIKKEI in-
dex in place of the TOPIX index is not reported 
but provides qualitatively similar results.
　Ⅳ　Historical Financial Performance
　Tokyo Dome Corp. recorded stable sales, 
operating profits, and net income from 2017 
through 2020 （Table 3）. However, the account-
ing profit generated by Tokyo Dome Corp. does 
not necessarily translate into a creation of eco-
nomic value through its operations unless the 
return exceeds the opportunity cost of capital. 
Hence, we turn to an economic value added 
（EVA） analysis to explore the financial perfor-
mance of Tokyo Dome Corp. prior to the TOB 
based on historical data.
　EVA is defined as net operating profit after 
tax （NOPAT） less capital times the opportuni-
ty cost of capital （Stewart, 1991; Hongo, 2019）. 
The weighted average cost of capital （WACC） 
is used as a measure of the opportunity cost of 
capital. Rearranging terms we have
EVA = −  
where Capital  comprises short-term and long-
term debt, and shareholders’equity. The ratio of 
NOPAT over Capital, , , is defined as the 
return on capital （ROC） and the EVA spread is 
defined as ROC less WACC or − . 
The estimated weighted average cost of capital 
ranged from a low of 2.51 percent in 2017 to a 
high of 2.9 percent for 2018 assuming a mar-
ket risk premium of 4.77 percent （Damodaran, 
2021）, and a credit risk premium for the cost 
of debt of 0.578 percent based on the average 
credit rating of A+ from R&I Credit Ratings 
and AA- from the Japan Credit Rating Agency. 
For the market beta we took an average of the 
fitted GARCH betas over the previous year. 
As summarized in Table 3, the EVA and EVA 
spread for Tokyo Dome Corp. was positive sug-
gesting the company created value. 
　We find EVA was positive from 2017 to 2020 
suggesting Tokyo Dome Corp. was creating val-
ue prior to the onset of the COVID 19 pandemic 
（Table 3）. However, upon closer inspection of 
the data, the EVA spread hovers close to zero 
with a slight reduction in the capital employed 
in 2020 （Figure 5）. Taking 2017 as a bench-
mark, the diagram reveals Tokyo Dome Corp. 
Table ３　Tokyo Dome Corporation Income Statement and EVA
Note:  Data from Tokyo Dome Corp. Financial Statements and Annual Reports. EVA 
calculations by authors. Figures in million yen. EVA Spread in percent. 
2017 2018 2019 2020 
Sales （Tokyo Dome: Stadium） 14,069 14,555 14,838 16,073 
Sales （Total） 87,761 83,686 87,048 91,557 
Cost of Sales 69,441 66,478 69.754 74,039 
SGA 5,731 5,819 5,813 5,790 
Operating Profit 12,589 11,389 11,481 11,728 
Income Before Tax 9,412 11,389 11,481 11,728 
Tax 2,777 3,233 3,211 3,363 
Net Income 6,635 8,116 6,962 8,002 
EVA Spread 1.11% 0.32% 0.48% 0.80% 
Economic Value Added 2,729 785 1,187 1,940 
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undertook a conservative strategy of enjoying 
marginal profitability coupled with shrinking 
capacity. The movement to the left from 2017 
to 2020 in Figure 5 is incremental, however, it is 
not sustainable in the long run thus opening the 
door for a takeover attempt by Oasis. While our 
findings indicate that Tokyo Dome Corp. was 
not necessarily destroying value, it is debatable 
whether it remained an attractive investment 
opportunity for potential investors and current 
shareholders. In this context, the issues raised 
by Oasis regarding the current management`s 
ability to maximize operational profitability are 
not simply unfounded criticisms. Furthermore, 
one could argue the suggested investments to 
upgrade the infrastructure of Tokyo Dome are 
necessary to improve revenue growth and cre-
ate future economic value.
　Ⅴ　Conclusion
　This paper is exploratory in nature with the 
modest objective of illustrating yet another 
example of the role that financial management 
and capital markets have to play in the world of 
professional sports, even in Japan. In this clini-
cal case study, we find the TOB announcement 
for Tokyo Dome Corp. had a positive impact on 
stock prices. Based on historical financial data, 
we can also argue that the proposal to renovate 
Tokyo Dome and to seek out a naming rights 
sponsor were reasonable in the context of cre-
ating economic value. In this respect, the Oasis 
proposal and preliminary bid clearly served as 
a catalyst triggering discussion on the merits 
of renovating the aged Tokyo Dome. A state-of-
the-art stadium located in central Tokyo would 
not only transform the consumer-fan experience 
but would also raise the visibility of Japanese 
athletics, bringing it to the next level in the 
world of professional sports. 
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